John Searle argues, through his Chinese Room thought experiment, that syntactic symbol manipulation (as seen in AI) cannot equate to genuine semantic understanding or consciousness. His assumption ties consciousness to biological processes, asserting that machines executing algorithms lack true understanding.In contrast, William Lycan takes a functionalist stance, positing that mental states are defined by their functional roles rather than physical makeup. According to Lycan, if a system behaves indistinguishably from humans, it can be considered conscious, as behavior reflects the presence of mental states.While Searle’s argument emphasizes the qualitative aspects of understanding and the distinction between syntax and semantics, Lycan focuses on behavior as an indicator of mental states. Both views are compelling but differ fundamentally in their assumptions and implications for AI.My evaluation: I find Searle’s argument more convincing due to its rigorous focus on the qualitative nature of understanding, which AI systems have yet to demonstrate. However, Lycan’s functionalist approach is valuable for advancing AI research and exploring its practical applications. Both perspectives provide critical insights into the debate on mind and machine intelligence.