2. Do you agree with Justice Brennan that the protective sweep goes beyond the Terry v. XXXX XXXXXXXX? Explain XXXX XXXXXXXX.
I XX XXX XXXXX with XXXXXXX XXXXXXX that XXX XXXXXXXXXX sweep went XXXXXX XXX Terry v. XXXX decision XXXXXXX XX XXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX in the case. XX February 3, 1986, two XXX, Jerome XXXX and XXXXX XXXXX, one XX which was dressed in a red jogging suit, committed an armed XXXXXXX XXXXXXX a XXXXXXXXX's XXXXX. Two XXXX XXXXX a warrant XXX XXXXXX XXX Buie, and officers went to Buie's XXXXX where he was XXXXXXXX as he came up from a basement. XXXXX XXXX was secured, XXXXXXXXX Joseph XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXX basement to XXXX XXXX XXXXX XXX XX XXX else XXXX XXXXX, XXXXX XXXX there, he XXXXXXX a XXX jogging XXXX XXX seized it XXX evidence. In Maryland XX. Buie (XXXX), XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXX a XXXXXXX XXX XXXXXX XXXX XXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXX went XXXXXX XXXXX v. Ohio (Maryland XX. XXXXXX Buie. (n.d.). I disagree XXXXXXX the law XXXXXXXXXXX officers were serving a XXXXXXX for XXX XXX XXX XXXXXXXXX an XXXXX robbery, therefore the XXXXXXXXX could XX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXX and dangerous, so a XXXXX of XXX basement, where one offender was XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX, seems XXXXXX. The officers XXX XX treat the situation as XX XXXX XXXX in XXXXXXXXXXX immediate XXXXXX. XXXXXXX, XXX XXXXXXX suit was in a place where the officer XXXXX XXXXXXX XXX it XXX XXXXXX XXXXXXXXX that XXX of the XXXXXXXXX was XXXXXXX a red jogging XXXX, retrieving it for evidence was XXXX XXXXX.
3. XXXX is curtilage? Open XXXXXX? XXX are XXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX in XXXXXXXX XXX
Curtilage XX XXX name given XX an XXXX XXXXXXXXXXX one’s XXXX where he or XXX can XXXXXX reasonable XXXXXXX. On XXX other XXXX, the XXXX XXXXX XXXXXXXX is a XXXX XXXX XXXXXX that anything that is in plain view, or can be XXXX XXXXXXX, XX XXXXXXX XX search XXXX it XX located on XXXXXXX XXXXXXXX. XXXX XXXXXX are not XXXXXXXXX XXXXX the Fourth XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX of the XXX it is XXXXXXX. In the fourth XXXXXXXXX, it states, "XXX XXXXX XX XXX XXXXXX to be XXXXXX in XXXXX XXXXXXX, XXXXXX, XXXXXX, and XXXXXXX..." XXXXXXX that XXXX XXX XXXXXXX XXXX and XXX XXXXXXXXX XX the home XX protected under the XXXXXXXXX (Hall, 2015). XXXXXXXXX is important because it XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX a XXXXXXXXXX right to XXXXXXX XXXXXXX of XXXXX home, XXXXXXX in some XXXXX, a XXXXXXX XXXXX XX XXXXXX XXX a XXXXXX XXX XXXXXXX. XX XX a bit XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX you may have an outer building XXXX is on XXX XXXXXXXX XXX may XXX be XXXXXXXXXX as part XX the curtilage (Hall XXXX). XXXX fields XXX XXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXX the XXXXXX XXXXXXXXX, it is XXXXXXXXX in XXXXXXXX law XXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX the XXXXXXX view or XXXXXXX surveillance on a residence XXXX XXX XXXX field XXXX XXXXXXX risk of violating one’s privacy.
4. XXXXXXXXXXX a XXXX XXXX an arrest; a frisk from a XXXXXX.
A XXXX XXX XXXX XXXXX if law XXXXXXXXXXX has a plausible suspicion XX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXX can only arrest XX utilizing a XXXXXXX or XXX probable XXXXX. XXXXXXXX cause meaning that an officer XXXXXXXX that a XXXXX XX, XXX, or will XX committed XX XXX XXXXXXXXXX. During a stop, a police XXXXXXX XXX XXXXXXX a frisk, XXXXX essentially XXXXX the XXXXXXX can feel outside, considered a pat-down, of XXXX XXXXXXXX for XXXXXXX XXX contraband. XX they should XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXX XX a XXXXXX, XXXX are legally able to reach in XXX take it. XXXXX XXXXX v. XXXX (1968) a stop XXX frisk can only be conducted "...in XXXXX a XXXXXXXXXX prudent officer XX XXXXXXXXX in the XXXXXXXXXXXXX XX a given case in believing XXXX his safety or that of XXXXXX XX endangered, he may make a reasonable XXXXXX XXX weapons XX the XXXXXX believed by him XX be armed and dangerous." On the XXXXX XXXX, a XXXXXX is a XXXXXX XXXX in-depth and XXXXX the officer the right to XXXXX XXX XXX just feel outside of clothing. X XXXXXX occurs after XXX XXXXXX of an individual (XXXXXXXXXXXX, n.d.).
5. In XXXXXX States v. XXXX, XXX Supreme Court XXXXXXX a XXXX-faith exception to XXX probable cause requirement XX the XXXXXX XXXXXXXXX. Under Leon, evidence seized in XXXX faith pursuant to a search XXXXXXX XX XXXXXXXXXX XX XXXXX, XXXX though it is XXXXX determined that XXXXXXXX XXXXX XXX XXXXXXX. Should this XXXXXXXXX be XXXXXXXX to XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX an officer XXX a XXXX-XXXXX XXXXXX that probable XXXXX XXXXXX?
A XXXX faith doctrine XX an XXXXXXXXX to XXX exclusionary rule XXXX states XXXX any evidence XXXX is XXXXXX in an unlawful manner XX XXX XXXXXXXXXX XX XXXXX (XXXX, 2015). In XXXXXX States v. XXXX (1984) XXX good XXXXX exception was given XXXXXXX XXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXX the warrant XX XX XXXXXXXX (XXXXXX XXXXXX v. Leon). XX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXX an officer XXXXXXXX a warrant is accurate, I think the XXXX faith exception XX XXXXX XXX should XX implemented, XXXXXXX, I XX XXX think XXXX XXX good XXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXX XX extended XX XXXXXXXXXXX searches. I XXXX that if an XXXXXXX believes he or XXX has a XXXXXXXXX reason XX XXXXXX a warrant, he or XXX should XX so. XX XXX good XXXXX XXXXXXXXX is XXXXX in XXXXX where a XXXXXXX was XXX XXXXXX, the XXXXXXX runs the XXXX XX XXXXXXXXX a XXXXXXX's XXXXXX XXXXXXXXX. In XXXXXXXX, I XXXX that some XXX enforcement XXXXXXXX XXXXX potentially take XXXXXXXXX XX XXX XXXXXX by XXXXX the XXXXXX XX XXXXXX a XXXXXXXX XXXXX XXX a search XXXX there XXXXXX is not one.
6. Do you believe that XXX exclusionary XXXX is XXXXXXXX XXXXX XXX Fourth XXXXXXXXX? XXX you XXXXX XX any XXXXXXXXXXXX XX the XXXX?
The XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX means XXXX any evidence XXXX XX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX is inadmissible in a criminal trial. XX XX a XXXX XXXX has been XXXXXXXX XXXXXXX. On XXX hand, XXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXX the Supreme XXXXX XXX XX right in XXXXXXXX the XXXX XXXXXXX their job is XX not XXXX the XXXX. XX the XXXXX XXXX, XXXX believe that XXX exclusionary XXXX is contradictory XX XXX Bill XX XXXXXX, XXXXXX it ineffective (XXXX, 2015). XXXX may XXXX that the exclusionary XXXX is XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX it deters XXXXXXX XXXXXX and XXXXXXXX conducted XX law enforcement officers XXX that there are no alternatives XX XXX XXX. However, according to XXX XXXXXXXX Criminal XXXXXXX Reference XXXXXXX (NCJRS), there XXX a XXX feasible XXXXXXXXXXXX. One XXXXX XX where the executive branch takes XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX investigate XXX XXXXXX any law XXXXXXXXXXX officers without it impacting the trial of XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX. Second would XX a XXXXX tort XXXXXX under XXX Federal Tort Claims Act XXX XXXXX would XX XX allow victims of searches XXX seizures a XXXXX against XXX XXXXXXXXXX regardless XX whether XXX XXXXXX revealed incriminating XXXXXXXX (XXXXXX, 1982).
XXXXXXXXX
XXXX, X. X. (XXXX). Criminal law XXX procedure (XXX ed.). New York: Cengage XXXXXXXX.
XXXXXXXX XX. XXXXXX XXXX. (n.d.). Retrieved XXXXX 07, 2018, XXXX XXXXX://XXX.XXXX.XXX/cases/1989/88-1369
XXXXXXXXXXXX, M. (n.d.). XXXX's the Difference XXXXXXX an XXXXXX XXX a Detention? Retrieved XXXXX XX, XXXX, from XXXXX://www.XXXX.com/XXXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXX/XXXX-s-XXX-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXX-arrest-XXXXXXXXX-XXXX-frisk.XXXX
XXX XXXXX of XXXXXXXX XX. XXXXXX Buie 494 X.S. XXX (1990)
XXXXXX States v. XXXX. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved XXXXX 7, XXXX, from https://XXX.XXXX.org/XXXXX/1983/XX-1771
XXXXXX, M. R. (XXXX). Constitutional XXXXXXXXXXXX XX the XXXXXXXXXXXX Rule. Retrieved April XX, 2018, from XXXXX://www.ncjrs.XXX/XXX/XXXXXXXXXXXX/XXXXXXXX.XXXX?ID=90632