2. Do you agree with Justice Brennan that the protective sweep goes beyond the Terry v. Ohio decision? XXXXXXX XXXX position.
I do not agree XXXX XXXXXXX Brennan that XXX protective sweep went XXXXXX XXX Terry v. Ohio XXXXXXXX because of XXX XXXXXXX presented in XXX case. XX XXXXXXXX X, XXXX, two men, Jerome Buie XXX XXXXX Allen, XXX XX which XXX dressed in a red jogging XXXX, committed an armed XXXXXXX against a Godfather's Pizza. Two days XXXXX a XXXXXXX was XXXXXX for Buie, XXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XX Buie's XXXXX XXXXX he XXX XXXXXXXX XX he XXXX up from a basement. XXXXX XXXX XXX XXXXXXX, Detective XXXXXX XXXXXXX entered XXX basement to XXXX sure XXXXX XXX no one XXXX down XXXXX, while XXXX there, he noticed a red jogging XXXX XXX XXXXXX it XXX XXXXXXXX. In XXXXXXXX vs. Buie (XXXX), XXXXXXX Brennan wrote a XXXXXXX and argued XXXX the XXXXXXXXXX sweep went beyond Terry v. XXXX (XXXXXXXX XX. Jerome Buie. (n.d.). I disagree because XXX law enforcement XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXX a warrant XXX XXX XXX who committed an armed XXXXXXX, therefore the XXXXXXXXX XXXXX XX XXXXXXXXXX armed and dangerous, so a sweep XX XXX basement, XXXXX XXX offender was XXXXXXX retrieved, seems XXXXXX. XXX XXXXXXXX had to treat XXX XXXXXXXXX XX XX XXXX XXXX in XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXX. Further, XXX XXXXXXX suit was in a place XXXXX XXX XXXXXXX could plainly see it and having XXXXXXXXX that one of XXX offenders was XXXXXXX a XXX XXXXXXX XXXX, XXXXXXXXXX it XXX evidence XXX also XXXXX.
X. XXXX XX XXXXXXXXX? Open XXXXXX? XXX are these concepts XXXXXXXXX in XXXXXXXX law
XXXXXXXXX is XXX name given to an area XXXXXXXXXXX XXX’s XXXX where he or she can XXXXXX reasonable XXXXXXX. On XXX XXXXX hand, the open XXXXX XXXXXXXX is a XXXX that XXXXXX that XXXXXXXX that is in XXXXX XXXX, or can be seen clearly, is subject to XXXXXX even it XX located on private property. XXXX XXXXXX are not XXXXXXXXX XXXXX the Fourth XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX of the way it is XXXXXXX. XX the fourth XXXXXXXXX, it states, "XXX XXXXX of the people to XX XXXXXX in their XXXXXXX, XXXXXX, XXXXXX, XXX XXXXXXX..." meaning that only the persons home and XXX XXXXXXXXX XX XXX home is protected under XXX XXXXXXXXX (XXXX, XXXX). Curtilage is XXXXXXXXX because it XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX a reasonable XXXXX to privacy outside of their home, XXXXXXX in XXXX cases, a warrant would be XXXXXX XXX a search and seizure. It XX a bit confusing XXXXXXX you may have an outer building that XX XX the XXXXXXXX but XXX XXX be considered XX part XX the curtilage (XXXX 2015). Open fields are not protected XXXXX XXX XXXXXX XXXXXXXXX, it is XXXXXXXXX in criminal XXX because XXXXXXXX have XXX ability view or conduct surveillance XX a residence from the open field XXXX without XXXX of XXXXXXXXX one’s XXXXXXX.
X. XXXXXXXXXXX a XXXX XXXX an arrest; a XXXXX from a search.
A XXXX can only occur if law XXXXXXXXXXX XXX a XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XX unlawful activity and XXX XXXX arrest XX utilizing a XXXXXXX or via XXXXXXXX cause. XXXXXXXX XXXXX meaning XXXX an officer believes that a crime XX, was, or will XX committed XX the XXXXXXXXXX. During a stop, a XXXXXX XXXXXXX may perform a frisk, XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XXX officer can XXXX XXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXX a XXX-XXXX, XX XXXX clothing XXX weapons XXX contraband. XX they XXXXXX XXXX what XXXX believe is a XXXXXX, XXXX are legally able XX reach in and XXXX it. Under XXXXX v. XXXX (XXXX) a stop XXX XXXXX XXX XXXX be conducted "...in XXXXX a reasonably prudent officer XX warranted in XXX circumstances of a XXXXX XXXX in believing XXXX XXX XXXXXX or that XX XXXXXX XX endangered, he XXX make a reasonable search XXX weapons of XXX XXXXXX XXXXXXXX XX him to be armed and XXXXXXXXX." On the other XXXX, a XXXXXX XX a little more in-depth XXX XXXXX XXX officer XXX XXXXX to XXXXX XXX not just XXXX XXXXXXX XX XXXXXXXX. X XXXXXX occurs after the arrest of an XXXXXXXXXX (Schwartzbach, n.d.).
5. In United States v. Leon, the XXXXXXX Court created a XXXX-faith XXXXXXXXX to the XXXXXXXX cause requirement of the XXXXXX XXXXXXXXX. XXXXX XXXX, XXXXXXXX XXXXXX in XXXX XXXXX pursuant XX a search warrant XX admissible at trial, even XXXXXX it XX later determined that probable XXXXX XXX XXXXXXX. Should this XXXXXXXXX XX extended XX warrantless searches XXXX an XXXXXXX XXX a good-faith belief XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXX XXXXXX?
A XXXX faith doctrine XX an exception XX XXX exclusionary XXXX that states that XXX XXXXXXXX XXXX is XXXXXX in an XXXXXXXX XXXXXX XX XXX admissible at XXXXX (Hall, XXXX). In XXXXXX XXXXXX v. Leon (1984) XXX XXXX XXXXX exception was XXXXX because the XXXXXXX believed XXX XXXXXXX XX XX accurate (United XXXXXX v. XXXX). XX situations where an officer believes a warrant XX XXXXXXXX, I XXXXX the XXXX faith XXXXXXXXX is valid XXX XXXXXX XX XXXXXXXXXXX, however, I XX XXX XXXXX that XXX good faith XXXXXXXXX should XX extended to warrantless XXXXXXXX. I XXXX that if an officer XXXXXXXX he or she XXX a plausible reason to obtain a warrant, he or she XXXXXX do so. If XXX good faith XXXXXXXXX XX given in XXXXX where a warrant XXX XXX issued, XXX officer XXXX the XXXX of XXXXXXXXX a suspect's Fourth XXXXXXXXX. In XXXXXXXX, I XXXX XXXX XXXX law enforcement XXXXXXXX could potentially take advantage of XXX system XX XXXXX the XXXXXX XX XXXXXX a probable XXXXX XXX a search XXXX there XXXXXX XX not one.
6. XX you XXXXXXX that the exclusionary rule is required XXXXX XXX XXXXXX XXXXXXXXX? XXX you XXXXX of XXX XXXXXXXXXXXX to XXX rule?
XXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX means XXXX any XXXXXXXX that XX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX is inadmissible in a XXXXXXXX trial. It XX a XXXX that has been fiercely debated. XX XXX hand, people XXXXXXX XXXX XXX XXXXXXX Court XXX no right in creating the rule because XXXXX XXX XX to not make XXX laws. XX XXX XXXXX XXXX, XXXX believe XXXX XXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX is contradictory to the Bill of XXXXXX, XXXXXX it XXXXXXXXXXX (Hall, XXXX). XXXX XXX XXXX XXXX XXX XXXXXXXXXXXX rule is XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX it deters XXXXXXX search and seizures conducted by law enforcement officers and XXXX XXXXX XXX XX XXXXXXXXXXXX XX XXX XXX. XXXXXXX, according to the XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX Justice Reference XXXXXXX (XXXXX), there XXX a few feasible XXXXXXXXXXXX. One would XX XXXXX the XXXXXXXXX XXXXXX takes XXXX responsibility XX investigate XXX XXXXXX any XXX XXXXXXXXXXX officers XXXXXXX it XXXXXXXXX the trial XX original offender. XXXXXX XXXXX be a XXXXX XXXX remedy XXXXX XXX XXXXXXX Tort XXXXXX XXX XXX XXXXX would be XX XXXXX victims XX XXXXXXXX XXX seizures a claim XXXXXXX XXX government regardless of whether the search revealed incriminating evidence (XXXXXX, XXXX).
XXXXXXXXX
Hall, X. E. (2015). Criminal law and procedure (XXX ed.). XXX XXXX: XXXXXXX Learning.
Maryland XX. XXXXXX XXXX. (n.d.). Retrieved April XX, XXXX, from XXXXX://www.oyez.org/cases/XXXX/88-1369
Schwartzbach, M. (n.d.). XXXX's XXX Difference Between an Arrest XXX a Detention? Retrieved XXXXX 07, XXXX, from XXXXX://XXX.nolo.XXX/legal-XXXXXXXXXXXX/XXXX-s-XXX-XXXXXXXXXX-between-arrest-detention-stop-XXXXX.XXXX
XXX XXXXX of Maryland XX. XXXXXX Buie XXX U.S. 325 (XXXX)
United States v. Leon. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved XXXXX 7, XXXX, from https://XXX.XXXX.org/cases/XXXX/82-1771
XXXXXX, M. X. (XXXX). XXXXXXXXXXXXXX Alternatives to the Exclusionary XXXX. Retrieved XXXXX XX, 2018, from https://XXX.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/XXXXXXXX.XXXX?ID=90632